Ineptitude is perhaps the best term in explaining the way Armenia’s Ministry of Diaspora has operated since its formation in 2008. Being the personal bureaucratic fiefdom of then-minister Hranush Hakobyan, the Ministry not only failed miserably to accomplish any of its broader objectives, but more problematically, it actually became counter-productive in formulating a healthy relationship with Armenia’s vast Diaspora. Bureaucratically irrelevant, functionally dysfunctional, and structurally incoherent, the purpose of having a Diaspora Ministry has sounded grand, but its actual existence has been everything but.

This perspective appears to garner much consensus from both internal observers within Armenian society as well as the Diaspora: everyone and everything has complained about the incompetence and, again, the ineptitude of this Ministry. In this context, it is a bit baffling that a broad range of Diasporan voices have displayed dismay, confusion, or misconstrued criticism at Armenia’s new government for implementing plans to eliminate, among four other ministries, the Ministry of Diaspora. Failing to genuinely understand the underlying objectives of this move, most Diasporan critics have relied on a knee-jerk reaction: the elimination of the Diaspora Ministry is directly and indirectly against the interests of the Diaspora. What they fail to cogently understand is that the elimination of the Diaspora Ministry has absolutely nothing to do with the Diaspora. Why? Because the Diaspora Ministry never served the interests of the Diaspora in the first place; that it could have is besides the point.

Whereas the Diaspora Ministry was to serve as a form of concierge to the global Armenian community, directing investments, guiding repatriation, and building social and cultural bridges between Armenian and Diasporan communities, it actually did the opposite; it disheartened interested investors who were not “connected,” developed a dismal reputation in the Diasporan communities, and bureaucratically, it overlapped and contradicted the activities of the Foreign Ministry.

In the wake of the Velvet Revolution, in came the Pashinyan Administration, inheriting a Ministry that had lost the one thing that defined it: the trust of the Diaspora. In essence, how can we speak of a Ministry of Diaspora, when the Diaspora, itself, has forsaken it? In the remaining six months of the Pashinyan Administration (up to the December 9 Parliamentary snap elections), the Diaspora Ministry did its utmost to achieve one major objective: regain the trust of the Diaspora. Newly-appointed Minister Mkhitar Hayrapetyan undertook a whirlwind tour of the major Armenian Diasporan communities, meeting leaders, consulting with the communities, and seeking to re-establish trust in the Homeland. That these efforts were met with skepticism cannot be denied; that the Diaspora cannot be blamed for this skepticism also cannot be denied: this paradox remained at the heart of the problem. Flanked by his competent Deputy Minister Babken DerGrigoryan, the Ministry audited and corrected the problems of the previous administration, introduced various policy proposals for change, and replaced the mismanaged Take a Step Home program with a revitalized My Step Towards Home program, as well as introducing the Neruzh Diasporan Youth Startup program. Collectively, these programs did not generate the necessary outcomes or substantive outputs anticipated. The Ministry of Diaspora no longer worked: it was too broken and too devalued.

The elimination of the Ministry, then, is not, in any way, an indictment of Armenia’s Diaspora, the Diaspora’s effort to support the Homeland, or the Diaspora’s future potential to greatly contribute. That is, the elimination of the Ministry had nothing to do with the Diaspora! That being said, a new question begs itself: what institutional mechanisms will the new government utilize or implement to continue, develop, and grow its relationship and possible integration with the Diasporan communities?

Noting the Diaspora’s important role in developing and implementing large body of projects in the country, there is mutual consensus that the Diaspora has invested heavily in Armenia, but has received very little in the way of returns on these investments. These returns, of course, are not monetary; this is not what the Diaspora wants. Rather, the Diaspora wants the returns on their investments in the form of political capital. And they have every right to demand such. In this context, the next level of Armenia-Diasporan relations cannot be between a Ministry and the broader Diaspora, or between a set of Diasporan leaders and a clique of Armenian politicians. Rather, this relationship must be elevated through the lens of institutional cooperation.

One of the important areas in Armenia’s Diasporan policies revolve around cooperation and coordination. While this was supposed to be the primary responsibility of the Ministry of Diaspora, the National Assembly, however, must be actively involved in these coordinations, through both policy-formation and oversight. The Legislative branch, the very institutions of the National Assembly, needs to articulate two important points: first, that it takes great interest in Armenian-Diasporan relations, and second, that the National Assembly works actively (apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to advance and represent the interests of the Diaspora in Armenia. In my analytical assessments and pattern-formation studies within the United States, three important factors stand out. First, while the Diaspora is excited about the Velvet Revolution, this has not translated into active involvement in Armenia’s political developments. Second, Diasporan Armenians, while emotionally connected to the Motherland, do not have a sense of concrete attachment; their attachment is abstract and idealistic. And third, Diasporan Armenians demonstrate a need for direct contact with lawmakers and policy-makers in Armenia.

In conclusion, noting the overarching context, increasing the exposure and institutional prestige of the National Assembly in the eyes of the Armenian Diaspora will pay important economic, cultural, and political dividends. Armenia’s National Assembly, as the most democratic institution of government, empowers the citizenry by working directly for the people first, before attending the interests of other governmental or business interests. This sense of empowerment may also be extended to Diasporan Armenians, for the logic becomes straightforward: the Standing Committee on Armenian-Diasporan Relations works directly for the mutual interests of the broader Armenian Nation, both in Armenia and abroad. This conceptual fusion of institutional prestige and institutional cooperation, then, can, in more concrete terms, contribute to the forming and consolidation of an effective bridge between the Republic and the broader Armenian Nation. The analytical consideration here presupposes a legislative Standing Committee as being far more effective and efficient in advancing the interests of Armenian-Diasporan relations, while, at the same time, being far more instrumental in tackling the multitude of problems and issue-areas confronting Armenian society. Considering the Diaspora’s continuous and loyal devotion to the Armenian Republic, a schematic approach that alleviates bureaucratic bloating, enhances legislative efficiency, and directly incorporates Diasporan interests not only offers the Diaspora a healthy dosage of political capital, but it also creates a culture of healthy reciprocity.