If you are concerned…vote RPA. 

If you are concerned…pay up. 

My Step campaign brochure.  

Bright Armenia campaign brochure.  

The “If you are concerned…vote RPA” campaign was quite an odd campaign message. First, the message did not parallel the mood of the country. Generally, Armenian voters were quite jubilant and optimistic about the upcoming elections and Armenia’s future. While prior to the Velvet Revolution the Armenian electorate was among the most pessimistic in the Caucasus, the aftermath of the revolution brought about optimism and hope in the mindset of the median Armenian voter. Moreover, because the so-called issues of “concern” were topics that Armenian voters were relatively unconcerned about, the message of concern failed to connect with the average voter. Further, the availability of social media created obstacles for RPA’s message. Almost instantly after the campaign message was publicized, Armenian voters took to social media to mock the RPA message through dozens of memes. The message (‘If you are concerned…pay up) has been revised to note the anecdotal evidence of Serzh Sargsyan’s brother as a nationwide extortionist. The abundance of such memes delegitimized the importance of the message. Contrary to RPA’s “doom and gloom” campaign, My Step PEC presented a message of optimism primarily centered around Pashinyan. The campaign slogan was “A happy individual, a caring society, a powerful state.” The two slogans could not be any more different: RPA presented a sense of concern and pessimism, while My Step presented optimism and strength.

At the onset of the campaign season, My Step’s strategy focused on the personality of Pashinyan and his populist rhetoric that was more about seeking justice against the corrupt elites of the previous regime. A typical My Step campaign rally began with a brief discussion of an issue (usually a valence issue, that is, an issue in which there is consensus about its position, such as water scarcity) that was important to that specific village or city. This was then followed by the populist rhetoric of Pashinyan dishing out verbal justice against the past ills of the elites. In retrospect, the average Armenian voter reacted more to the rhetoric than to the policy.  

Compared to My Step PEC, BAP’s campaign centered more around the political, social, and economic issues facing the Armenian voter. Lacking a Pashinyan-esque charismatic leader, the BAP relied on the cool and collective image of its two main leaders, Edmond Marukyan and Mane Tandilyan. BAP’s political message paralleled that of My Step, an optimistic and joyful period for Armenia. BAP’s leadership team and issue-centric message was evident in its campaign flyers. Whereas, Pashinyan takes center stage in the My Step flyer, the BAP flyer provided a thorough breakdown of its policies in various issue domains, something missing in the My Step campaign message.

The Transformation of the Armenian Voter

The post-Soviet Armenian voter is considered relatively apathetic about the significance of the political process and economically pessimistic about their and the country’s overall economic perspective. Past sociological surveys have found Armenians to be the most pessimistic about trusting their political institutions and the electoral process. 

In 2018, the Armenian voter found itself in much more favorable conditions. The 2018 ArmES noted the overall optimism of the Armenian voter. When comparing the questions above in 2017 and in 2018, it becomes clear that the Armenian voter is generally more optimistic about the last 12-month period. Relatively speaking, all five issues witnessed a significant drop in the number of respondents who perceived the issue being worse off. For example, the issue of prices witnessed a drop from 83 percent to 53 percent; poverty witnessed a drop of almost 50 percentage points. Perhaps the two most extreme cases of change was the issues of Artsakh and bribery. In 2018, only 5 percent of voters disclosed the Artsakh issue as being worse today than in 2017. And just 3 percent of voters disclosed bribery as being worse off today than in 2017. Overall, the descriptive data points toward a public that is relatively optimistic about the five salient issues.

Economic Perceptions

Aside from measuring how Armenians perceived changes in political, social, and economic issues, ArmES also gauged the economic perceptions of the Armenian voter. Economic perceptions is divided into two dimensions. The first deals with time-period. Voters are asked retrospective questions and prospective questions. The second dimension deals with the spacial aspect of the economy. Voters are asked pocketbook questions and sociotropic questions. The former measures changes in their personal (or household) economic situation, while the latter measures changes in the country’s economic situation. In 2017 and 2018, the Armenian voter was asked a retrospective-sociotropic question: Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to 12 months ago: economic situation of the country?; and a prospective-sociotropic question: Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: economic conditions in this country in twelve months? 

Empirically, prospective attitudes are more likely to witness positive responses. Thus, the higher percentage of a positive wellbeing in a prospective vis-à-vis retrospective judgement in both 2017 and 2018 is in accordance with conventional theory. 

Partisanship and Elections

The Post-Soviet space is notable for its lack of partisanship and in Armenia we witness the minimal role that party identification plays in shaping the electoral behavior of the Armenian voter. In 2017, ArmES asked Armenian voters if they feel close to any particular political party? Two-thirds of Armenian voters responded in the negative. Only 29 percent of Armenian voters disclosed party identification. The distribution of partisanship among such voters favored the PAP and RPA. Specifically, of the 29 percent that identified themselves as partisan, 38 percent identified with PAP, 30 percent identified with RPA, and 6 percent identified with Yelk. The single digit support for Yelk, a political bloc that included what later became My Step PEC and Bright Armenia, was not surprising as Armenian voters were patronal voters. That is, they identify and support the party from which they can engage in upward socioeconomic mobility. In developed countries, partisanship and electoral party support is based on issue convergence, or the proximity between the party’s issue positions and that of the voter. In the developing world, partisanship and electoral party support is based on clientelism. In Armenia, we witness a distinct form of clientelism, that of patronal voting. The electorate sided with the RPA and PAP because of a familial or relational proximity with the party, which then helps them further their economic mobility. This then creates a wider patronal network around each party.[2]  

The 2017 ArmES posed a vote intention question that asked voters If the April 2017 parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, what party (or alliance) would you vote for? Here we witness further evidence of political apathy as the majority of the respondents either refused to answer, did not know, or intended to vote for nobody. Of the parties and alliances listed on the 2017 ballot, approximately 15 percent of respondents intended to vote for PAP; 13 percent intended to vote for RPA; and 3 percent intended to vote for the Yelk Bloc. The fact that the PAP led the RPA in vote intention should not be interpreted as a statistical inference. This descriptive figure discounts the majority of voters who chose not to provide an answer in the affirmative. What the vote intention questionnaire does entail is the larger disengagement of party support on the part of the Armenian voter.

The 2018 snap parliamentary election provided a distinct playing field to measure political behavior and public opinion. Widespread support for Pashinyan was recorded in the second wave when 93 percent of respondents disclosed either somewhat approval or strong approval of the way Pashinyan is handling his job as Armenia’s Prime Minister. This questionnaire provided a heuristic in terms of the support his party would obtain.

The decline of the RPA and the ascendance of My Step as the new party of power may result in the decline of Armenian partisanship. Since the RPA is no longer at the helm of political power, many patronal voters now will no longer identify with the RPA. At the opposite end, such voters have yet to receive patronage from My Step and thus are still at the sidelines about identifying with My Step. The descriptive results from the partisanship questionnaire may point to this exact trend. From 2017 to 2018 we notice a decrease in party identification of approximately 11 percentage points. The reason for the drop can be due to either the exodus of the RPA or the social desirability effect of RPA partisanship. The latter would suggest that the 11 percent decrease in partisanship across Armenia is mainly due to the unpopularity of feeling close to the RPA. Thus, past voters who identified with the RPA are no longer partisan RPA members solely because it is socially undesirable to do so.

The 2018 ArmES gauged both partisan and non-partisan voters about their political preferences. Not surprisingly, both sets of voters overwhelming preferred My Step PEC. Among voters who identified feeling close to a political party, My Step received a stunning 79 percent of party affiliation. The next closest party was the PAP at a mere 8 percentage points. Among non-partisans, My Step received association from half of the non-partisan respondents. This figure is quite interesting as it points toward the popularity of My Step among the non-partisan public. We can provide two hypotheses as to why a political unengaged individual would choose My Step. First, in the post-Velvet Revolutionary climate it is socially desirable to identify with the My Step PEC. The high marks given to Pashinyan for his job performance suggests an electorate (both partisan and non-partisan) that is overall pleased with the acting prime minister. The second hypothesis suggests that such voters, while still non-partisan, are in the process of forming their political preferences. Since My Step is a relatively new bloc, some voters are still “testing the waters” prior to fully embracing the party. In all, the figures below look quite promising for the future of My Step partisanship.  

In developing countries, the vote intention question merits a large percent of respondents either refusing or answering “I don’t know.” Such was the case in the 2017 ArmES survey. However, in 2018, when it came to vote intention, respondents overwhelmingly supported the My Step alliance. The bloc received some 62 percent of electoral support. While the ranking distribution is like the actual vote result (First place: My Step; second place: BHK; third place: BAP), the actual vote percentages are lower than the figures reported by the CEC. This is due to the inclusion of voters who answered “I don’t know” or refused to provide an answer.